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The paper examines the emergence of a new landscape of international development finance that 
is blurring traditional boundaries between public and private resources for meeting the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other global public goods (GPGs). In the SDG 
financing ecosystem, private actors are no longer passive bystanders in the development process 
but as active contributors to and investors in development projects and programmes. The paper 
argues that the emerging ‘private turn’ in the architecture of development finance represents a 
technology of governance that is rooted in the assemblage of international development policy 
and practice. This regime constitutes an emerging complex and often problematic framework of 
organising and managing countries’ access to external finance and establishing their terms of 
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International development finance has emerged as a centrepiece for the international community 
as the world responds to the health, social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The health, social and economic crises brought on by the pandemic require large-scale injections 
of external finance to meet immediate interventions and support short and long-term relief and 
recovery measures in developing countries (UN, 2020). Financial resources are also crucial to 
ensuring that progress towards broader global sustainable development objectives, notably 
commitments made under the auspices of the United Nations (UN)’s 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) and its associated Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), is not significantly derailed by the pandemic.  
 
As global policymakers begin resetting the international agenda for sustainable development in 
the context of COVID-19, it is also important to cast a spotlight on the architecture for the 
mobilisation and disbursement of these global resources that has undergone significant changes 
in the past few years. A key development in the framework for financing for development since 
the inception of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs has been the emergence of the ‘new ecosystem of 
investment for sustainable development’ (Blended Finance Innovators, 2016) that is blurring 
traditional demarcations between public and private resources for financing development and 
global public goods. The rise of private non-profit and for-profit actors in international 
development financing is reorienting the role of official financiers from funders of development 
and global public goods to brokers of private financing for these purposes. 
This shift in global public policy is transforming the regulatory and governance landscape of 
international development finance, moving away from traditional, more hierarchical forms of aid 
governance and public administration towards what scholars have termed ‘contractual’ 
governance (Cutler and Thomas, 2015) and ‘hybrid transnationalism’ (Richley and Ponte, 2015) 
in the international development cooperation where development actors and alliances are 
regulated less through formal transgovernmental regimes and more through webs of private 
agreements and compacts to deliver development finance and meet global public policy 
challenges. 
 
An important aspect of this new landscape is the endorsement of private actors and market 
models as key to overcoming the ‘resource gap’ of ‘billions to trillions’ to meet the SDGs (World 
Bank, 2015) and, in contemporary circumstances, meeting the challenge of pandemic and post-
pandemic resourcing (see Le Houérou, 2020). Although deeply embedded within a globalized 
and marketised and assemblage of economic and geopolitical relations, the SDG financing 
agenda has been turned into a depolicitised technical exercise where answers to from structural 
constraints of the global economy and the systemic inequalities of the legal and regulatory 
architecture that supports it. Accompanying this discursive policy shift is a corresponding pivot 
towards private systems of governance, such as private regulatory standards and indicators, audit 
systems and private grievance processes to regulate development finance.  
 
This paper examines the shift in the governance and regulation of international development 
finance and its impact not only on development policy and practice but also on client countries 
and communities’ broader socio-economic and political organisation and their engagement with 
the global economy. The paper argues that this emerging regulatory regime is a technology of 
governance that reinforces the depoliticisation of the international development framework. This 
regime establishes a technical agenda that problematises governance and accountability of public 
finance and the provision of global public goods as one of quantification and management that 
can be resolved through ‘calculative practices’ (Ilcan and Lacey, 2015: 615) of measurement and 
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reporting and the deployment of expert knowledge and ‘scientific’ authority. The development of 
these regulatory norms and expert ideas are rooted in the ‘club’-like governance regime of the 
new aid architecture that is populated by a transnational policy elite of western donor states, 
private investors, northern bureaucrats and transnational civil society actors that have resulted in 
this ‘ideational convergence’ on the form and content of aid governance1. 
 
Drawing on the concept of the ‘assemblage’ developed by critical geographers and development 
scholars (Ferguson, 1994; Ilcan and Lacey, 2015; Li, 2007a), this paper situates these governance 
mechanisms within the proliferating transnational regulatory ‘audit culture’ (Shore and Wright, 
2015) that fails to engage with or, in some circumstances, displaces more traditional forms of 
social and political accountability, at local, national and transnational levels, including those 
developed through international and national law. Consequently, concerns over both the 
distributive elements of aid and development finance and countering negative social and 
environmental dislocations of development projects are seen as adequately addressed through 
private regulatory standards and corporate disclosure and reporting regimes. This has significant 
consequences not only for the substantive efficacy of the SDG financing agenda but more 
importantly, the broader engagement of the developing countries within the global economy. 
Most notably, the shift to private governance systems in this way undermines accountability and 
diffuses public oversight over key distributive decisions while further constraining countries’ 
access to and control over resources for sustainable development.  
 
2. The Assemblage of Private Development Finance 
 
(a) Assembling the New Ecosystem  
 
The emergence of this new landscape of privatised development finance can be located within 
the broader ‘reengineering of public finance’ that has taken place in the wake of the global 
‘rebalancing of markets and states’ (Kaul and Conceição, 2006a: 3). In this reconfiguration, 
public finance is viewed less about taxation and expenditure but more about the deployment of 
fiscal, regulatory and other tools of public administration to harness and complement private 
sector resources to meet public policy objectives, including global public policy goals (Kaul and 
Conceição, 2006a: 7). This ‘new public finance’ responds to the two major trends we have 
witnessed in the past two decades in the reorganisation of states and markets in domestic and 
transnational governance and policymaking: (1) the blurring of boundaries between private and 
public spheres of social and economic activity, particularly in the provision of and regulation of 
access to public goods and services; and (2) the extension of public finance challenges beyond 
the state to respond to growing social, economic, ecological and geopolitical interdependence 
beyond geographical borders (ibid: 3 – 21).  
 
Operationally, the shift to private financing for sustainable development covers a broad range of 
policy manoeuvres and changing modalities. It includes the channelling of official development 
assistance (ODA)2 and other forms of international development finance into private 
investments, particularly through bilateral or multilateral development finance institutions 
(DFIs); the growing establishment of and reliance on public-private partnerships (PPPs) with 
 
1 See Tsingou (2015) on the idea of ‘club governance’ and below for further discussion. 
2 At present, the OECD classifies ODA as resource transfers to developing countries and multilateral institutions 
from donor countries which are: (a) provided by official agencies; (b) aimed at the promotion of economic 
development and welfare of developing countries; and (c) concessional in character and convey a grant element of at 
least 25 percent (OECD, 2019). However, the OECD is currently reforming its statistical and measurement 
framework which will, among other things, change the way concessionality is measured so that higher thresholds are 
introduced for lending to countries in higher need and importantly for our purposes here, track ‘ODA used to 
catalyse private sector investment in development’ (ibid). 
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commercial and other private actors for development cooperation; and the proliferation of 
private development assistance and the emergence of philanthropic foundations and social 
enterprises as international development actors. In the new SDG financing ecosystem, private 
actors are no longer passive bystanders in the development process nor engaged merely as clients 
or contractors for bilateral or multilateral development organisations but they have become co-
investors and co-producers in development projects and programmes.  
  
Transposed into international development policymaking and governance, these new 
reconfigurations posit state and non-state actors as complementary partners in the financing and 
delivery of sustainable development and other GPGs, transforming international cooperation in 
these arenas from ‘an intergovernmental process to a multiactor process’, with bilateral and 
multilateral governmental actors and non-state entities, such as business and civil society, like 
their national counterparts, ‘cooperating and competing to deliver both public goods and equity 
more efficiently and effectively’ (Kaul and Conceição, 2006b: 35). This has been complemented 
by the rise in so-called ‘multi-stakeholderism’ (Benedek, 2011) in international law and global 
governance in which non-state actors have been increasingly recruited to perform a variety of 
functions in arenas that have previously been exclusive domains of states, including policy-
setting, rulemaking, regulatory compliance and service delivery (ibid: 201 – 203; Pattberg et al, 
2012: 3 – 4).  
 
The policy and regulatory changes accompanying the new landscape of development finance are 
thus embedded within broader contemporary ‘assemblages of international development’ (Ilcan 
and Lacey, 2015) that are increasingly positioning and deploying market values and norms as 
principal modes by which the design, delivery and measurement of poverty reduction, economic 
growth, social welfare, gender equality, climate change mitigation and adaptation and other 
objectives of international sustainable development are framed, financed and operationalised 
(ibid; Brooks, 2016; Rosenman, 2017; Soederberg, 2013). The SDGs have been framed as a 
‘compelling market opportunity’ for businesses (Convergence, 2018: 6) and the legal and 
regulatory frameworks are to be designed to facilitate these market opportunities. 
 
The ‘assemblage’ as a concept is drawn from the literature on governmentality (see Dean, 2010; 
Ferguson, 1994; Foucault, 1980; Rose, 1999) that broadly refers to the set of discourses and 
regime of practices that are assembled to address and resolve an identified need (Li, 2007a: 264). 
Government interventions in the economy and society are said to be assembled from a 
multiplicity of heterogenous elements, including ‘discourses, institutions, forms of expertise and 
social groups whose deficiencies need to be corrected’ (Li, 2007a: 264). As a conceptual device, 
the ‘analytic of the assemblage’ (ibid) has been applied to the arena of international development 
by different scholars as a means of understanding how disparate components of international 
development policy and practice work together to create a powerful regime of governance within 
and outside third world states (ibid; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1993; 
Ilcan and Lacey, 2015; Soederberg, 2013). 
 
Viewing international development policy and practice through the prism of the assemblage 
enables us to recognise and deconstruct the regime of discourses and practices that have served, 
in the postcolonial period, to organise and legitimise specific patterns of production and 
consumption and socio-economic organisation the third world. These technologies of 
governance rely heavily on mechanisms of representation and signification to embed ideas and 
knowledge about how we structure societies and the economies. As both critical development 
scholars and third world international lawyers have demonstrated, the development discourse 
has been central to the maintenance of geopolitical and material imperial control in the 
postcolonial period (see Anghie, 1999; Escobar, 1995; Pahuja, 2011). The development discourse 
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and the systems of knowledge production it produces create an effective ‘regime of government 
over the Third World’ (Escobar, 1995: 9) that is as powerful as the international legal 
architecture and other modalities of transnational political and economic regulation. 
 
(b) Technologies of Governance 
 
The privatisation agenda in international development illustrates the ways in which the 
technologies of governance work in the global economy. This regime relies on the two key 
practices that have long been utilised by development institutions to manage and implement 
development projects and programmes:  
1) the process of problematisation or identification of deficiencies that requires an intervention 
or remedy ; and 2) the ‘rendering technical’ or construction of technical solutions to the 
development problems identified and the creation of an ensemble of expertise on how to do 
so(Li, 2007b: 7). As Li has argued the ‘identification of a problem is intimately linked to the 
availability of a solution … they coemerge within a government assemblage in which certain 
sorts of diagnoses, prescriptions and techniques are available to the expert who is properly 
trained’ (ibid). The consequence of the process of problematisation and technicisation is the 
depoliticisation of development policymaking and operational practice so that expertise is enrolled 
to insulate development interventions from political contestation (Bebbington, 2005; Li, 2007b: 
8); McCoy and Singh, 2014: 151 – 152). 
 
This process results in what Ferguson famously termed the ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson, 
1994), the way in which development programmes have been designed to exclude considerations 
of broader socio-political questions and contain political advocacy for broader structural 
transformations (see Bebbington, 2005; Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007a & b). The depoliticisation of 
the development sphere results in less focus on addressing the broader systemic causes of global 
development challenges – including inequalities in economic opportunities and health and 
educational outcomes due to asymmetries and regulatory gaps in the international economic legal 
order or ecological crises from patterns of neoliberal production and consumption – and a 
prioritisation of operationally bounded solutions to a technically defined diagnoses of a 
development ‘problem’, such as how to fund vaccination problems or generate finance for an 
electricity grid (see Li, 2007: 6 – 8; McCoy and Singh, 2014: 151 – 152).  
 
In the case of the shift towards privatised development finance, the assemblage of international 
development, the process of technicisation and depoliticisation has led to a curious isolation of 
transformative politics that originally animated the global debates on the SDGs. Many observers 
have commented on how the SDGs, while not without problems, did create normative shifts in 
the international development agenda, reconceptualising development as a holistic and complex 
process that overcomes some of the more reductionist critiques of their predecessor, the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which they replaced in 2015 (Caballero, 2019; Fukuda-
Parr and McNeil, 2019). However, by moving the programme of global cooperation on 
development away from issues of economic redistribution towards that of financial resourcing, 
the new conceptual framings of the SDG financing agenda have somewhat blunted the political 
dimensions of the SDGs and the original Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development. 
This financing agenda can and have marginalised calls for broader transformations in the global 
economy to remove the structural barriers developing countries faced in meeting development 
and other public goods objectives, such as in trade, investment, taxation and sovereign debt.  
 
While the movement towards this so-called ‘privatisation of aid’ predates the SDGs3, Agenda 
2030 has accelerated this shift by endorsing and amplifying) the role of the private sector in 
 
3 See for example, Mawdsley (2015). 
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mobilising and delivering the financial resources to support attainment of the SDGs, including 
emphasising the role of official financing in catalysing private resources (UN, 2015a: para 43; 
2015b: para 48 & 54). Problematising the attainment of the SDGs as primarily a resource 
challenge for the public purse rather than a political question of global redistributive decisions 
reframes international development cooperation from a political question of socialised, collective 
responsibility to one that is premised on bringing more financial actors and instruments to the 
table and on how these new financial resources can be incentivised and deployed. This is the 
narrative that will likely underpin current global initiatives to ‘build back better’ after COVID-19 
(OECD, 2020a), including positioning DFIs as ‘economic first responders’ (EDFI, 2020), scaling 
up blended finance (Convergence, 2020) and promoting ‘impact investing’ (ICMA, 2020a; IFC, 
2020a) as financial complements to traditional official development finance in pandemic 
responses.  
 
The logic of public-private cooperation is sustained by two important narratives that have been 
prominently enrolled to rationalise, endorse and embed the increasing participation of private 
actors in the mobilisation, disbursement and delivery of development finance. First, private 
finance and the use of public and/or philanthropic resources to mobilise commercial resources is 
viewed as crucial to ‘growing the overall financing pie’ (OECD, 2017: para 14 – 17) and bridging 
the ‘financing gap’ between the ambitious targets of the SDGs4 and public finance shortfalls 
(Mawdsley, 2018; Watts and Scales, 2020). High-profile policy documents and political 
declarations routinely highlight the need to progress beyond the ‘billions’ mobilised through 
traditional ODA to harnessing the ‘trillions’ potentially available through public and private 
investments5 (see OECD, 2016: 27; World Bank, 2015: 1).  
 
Second, private finance is represented as an antidote to the inefficiency and opacity of traditional 
public finance (see Gibbs, 2020) and its failure to account for ‘how resources are spent on the 
ground’ (Keohane, 2016: 11). Market models, particularly financial market innovations, are 
promoted as solutions to bringing in much needed ‘discipline, efficiency and accountability to 
development’ lacking in traditional aid instruments to meet the SDGs and other GPGs (ibid: 6 – 
7) while at the same time socialising market actors by making the ‘business case’ for socially 
responsible and ecologically sustainable private investments (OECD, 2016: 17). 
 
In this landscape, public and private sectors are co-imbricated in the restructuring of policy and 
regulatory frameworks of international development finance and in the creation of new markets 
and mechanisms to accommodate and facilitate these reformulations of public finance. 
Specifically, the hybrid modalities of the new development financing architecture constitute part 
of a broader emerging set of financial markets called social or innovative finance that aims to 
correct both market and public policy failures in the delivery of development and other global 
public goods and services (see Dowling, 2017; Kaul and Conceição, 2006b; Keohane, 2016; 
Rosenman, 2017, Soederberg, 2013). Under this paradigm, state actors create the financial, policy 
and regulatory foundations and incentives for private sector engagement in social or sustainable 
development investment ‘markets’ while private commercial and non-profit actors step in to 
‘close the funding gap’ or ‘encourage more efficient delivery’ of social and development projects 
and programmes (Keohane, 2016: 7; also Kaul and Conceição, 2006b: 37 – 38).  
 
 
4 The SDGs, implemented through Agenda 2030 are a set of development goals, targets and indicators which 
replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when they expired in 2015. See: 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ 
5 For example, the OECD estimates that investment needs for the SDGs to be around US$3.3 – 4.5 trillion a year 
(OECD, 2016: 27), well above current aid levels of US$153 billion in 2019 (Seggers, 2020: 6 – 7). This is likely to 
increase significantly with the economic shocks from COVID-19 with the UN estimating a need of US$500 billion 
in ODA to fund emergency health and social relief services alone (ibid).  
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Law and regulatory regimes become integral to this reconfigured landscape of development 
finance, creating the aforementioned infrastructure for the commodification of global public 
goods as well as structuring the terms upon which the reconstituted producers and consumers of 
development finance engage and interact with each other and the state or community of states as 
an intermediary or facilitator of access to such public goods. The result of these changes has 
been the rapid expansion of what Salomon describes as ‘an elaborate system of third-party 
government in which crucial elements of public authority are shared with a host of non-
governmental and other-governmental actors, frequently in complex collaborative systems’ 
(Salomon, 2001: 1613). As blended and private finance become increasingly central in COVID-
19 and post-COVID-19 development policy responses, these new governance formations are 
likely to be further concretised by international policymakers (see for example, OECD, 2020b; 
UN DESA, 2020). 
 
3. New Governance Formations 
 
(a) Audit Culture and Benchmark Governance 
 
Accompanying the positioning of private actors as technical solutions to a development 
problematic – the lack of development resources – discussed in the previous section, is a parallel 
positioning of private systems of governance as the regulatory solution to concerns over 
regulatory oversight and accountability of these private entities. An emerging component of this 
new architecture of aid governance is the use of transnational indicators, metrics, codes of 
conduct and internal accountability mechanisms as means of supervising, monitoring and 
regulating the use of blended and private finance deployed to meet SDG objectives. These 
standards and codes range from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s 
Blended Finance Principles (OECD, 2018) to the International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s 
Operating Principles for Impact Management (OPIM) (IFC, 2019) and the European 
Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) Principles for Responsible Financing of Sustainable 
Development (EDFI Principles) (EDFI, 2019a) to the International Capital Market Association 
(ICMA) voluntary guidelines on the issuance of green, social and sustainability bonds (ICMA, 
2020b).  
 
Accordingly, the current financing for development agenda, mirroring the broader SDG 
framework, is creating and deepening what Merry calls ‘the infrastructure of measurement’ 
(Merry, 2019) that is fast becoming the default regulatory regime for the new privatised aid 
landscape. Collectively, these components of the new international development assemblage, can 
be broadly referred to as elements of an audit culture or audit society (Power, 1997) that serves 
to regulate inasmuch as it is regulated by the private entities and their interlocutors within the 
international development policy community. This paper argues that the audit culture in relation 
to private development finance is comprises of two interrelated parts: 1) the use of non-binding 
codes of conduct or private regulatory standards in lieu of direct regulation by state entities or 
international organisations, and 2) the use of these codes and standards and CSR-like regimes to 
monitor and measure compliance with development targets, objectives and accountability. The 
overall result is the increasing proliferation of standards and codes and standard-setting agencies 
and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms composing the general architecture of 
supervision and surveillance over the providers but mainly the recipients of development 
finance.  
 
Embedded within this regime are various nested sets of indicators and benchmarks, data 
generated to rank and classify actions and outcomes relating to the mobilisation and 
disbursement of development finance. For example, the OECD’s Blended Finance Principles 
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consist of a set of five core principles aimed at guiding policymakers in the use and application 
of blended finance, consisting of both general normative commitments (‘Principle 1: Anchor 
Blended Finance Use to a Development Rationale’) and specific undertakings to track, map and 
collect ‘financial flows, commercial performance and development results’ (Principle 5: Monitor 
Blended Finance for Transparency and Results’) (OECD, 2018). Meanwhile, the OPIM and the 
EDFI Principles for Responsible Financing of Sustainable Development both contain 
commitments to mainstream social and environmental impact management into their operations, 
establish codes of conduct for investee companies as well as commitments to harmonise and 
strengthen development impact measurement and reporting (EDFI, 2019a; IFC, 2019).   
 
The use of rankings within the international development sphere to allocate resources is not new 
as bilateral and multilateral financiers have routinely used indicators to rank and score 
governments on a range of policy, institutional and regulatory performance to allocate ODA and 
other development funds and to determine the terms under which they are disbursed (Bhuta, 
2015; Halliday, 2015; Pistor, 2015).  
What is new about the use of indicators in the context of blended and private finance for 
development is their enmeshment with private and commercial regulatory regimes and the 
insertion of private actors within this process of governance and regulation. The effect of these 
developments is reducing public surveillance of private financiers while correspondingly 
increasing the power of these private entities to survey and allocate capital to these countries and 
communities.  
 
Here, the use of these audit and calculative practices of measurement serve two objectives vis-a-
vis the privatised development regime: 1) it normalises and validates the legitimacy of the shift 
from public to private forms of financing through authenticating the normative and operational 
role of private and blended finance in the international development sphere; and 2) it constructs 
a regime of governance which reinforces and furthers the ideational and material move from 
public financing of development and global public goods towards mixed and wholly private 
mechanisms of aid and development finance.  
In other words, the process of data-gathering, ranking and standardising data can serve to 
discipline actors subject to their authority, and the data that is gleaned from these calculative 
practices can also be used to further reinforce this discipline and to justify and legitimise 
particular policy choices. Sending refers to this use of scientific knowledge as a form of ‘policy’ 
storytelling, constituting ‘a symbolic resource’ that is deployed to persuade and mobilise support 
from different stakeholders and ‘for formulating and establishing policy practices’ (Sending, 
2003: 58).  
 
Additionally, the construction of these techniques as necessarily apolitical and technical exerts a 
powerful discursive disciplinary regime over the objects of its supervision – in this case, 
developing countries and their communities. The presentation of these indicators as 
administrative mechanisms for regulating access to and use of development funds/external 
finance to developing countries neutralises their significant political import. This narrative 
obscures the ways in which rankings, standards and codes of conduct have ‘regulatory effects’ 
because they set universal norms for measuring the conduct of supervised entities (Davis et al, 
2012: 84). As a modality of governance, the audit and benchmarking culture reinforces the 
technicisation of international development finance, rendering aspects of political contestation 
and socio-economic claims for redistribution and accountability into components of calculative 
measurement while, at the same time, introducing an increasingly intrusive surveillance regime 
over countries in receipt of private or blended development finance. These governance effects 
are often asymmetrical as they are inserted into the ‘tension-ridden’ terrain of development 
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policymaking ‘in which the global North produces norms and framings that are then 
transplanted and imposed on the global south’ (Dadush, 2012: 430). 
 
(b) Diffused Accountability  
 
Conceptualising benchmarking as ‘a mode of transnational governance’, Broome and Quirk argue 
that the popularity of benchmarks as a regulatory device is due to their capacity to reduce 
complex social phenomena and often ‘highly contentious policy goals and political agendas’ into 
‘ostensibly neutral language of technocratic assessment and numerical comparison’ (Broome and 
Quirk, 2015: 821). In the field of international development finance, this process of 
simplification and standardisation is aimed at generating a common mode of assessment to guide 
both ex-ante allocation of development resources, including screening of potential recipients, and 
ex-post supervision of how these resources have been deployed, including monitoring and 
redressing any adverse outcomes from the use of project or programme funds.  
 
The emergence of an audit culture attached to the monitoring and supervision of private 
development finance exemplifies the shifting governance contours of international development 
cooperation. The dispersal of development finance across a more diverse range of providers and 
platforms has meant an increasing fragmentation of aid governance but also increasingly, a shift 
towards a more diffused modality of regulating the exercise of mobilising, disbursing and 
accounting for the use of development finance6 (Tan, 2019). The movement to privatised forms 
of development finance, including blended finance, PPPs and impact investments by public and 
private financial actors will both: a) increase fragmentation and intermediation in the oversight 
and governance of public concessional and non-concessional development finance; and b) 
undermine the already weak mechanisms for aid accountability at national and international 
levels (ibid). The movement of development finance into private arenas, particularly when it 
involves a co-mingling of funds (such as under blended finance operations or designated ‘impact’ 
bond issuances by public entities), will result in a greater fragmentation of the regimes of 
accountability for development finance.  
 
This turn to private standards and audits as the regulatory regime governing private development 
finance is unsurprising given that these forms of governance are especially popular in the three 
main arenas that comprise the new architecture of aid: governance of ODA, corporate 
accountability and the regulation of financial markets. All three regimes, which come together in 
the rapidly emerging privatised development landscape, rely significantly on these ‘soft’, non-
binding modes of regulation and supervision, including in the aforementioned ex-ante due 
diligence and ex-post M&E and grievance and remedial mechanisms (see Broome and Quirk, 
2015).  
 
Decision-making, standard-setting and regulatory oversight in these areas are often achieved 
through the use of non-binding instruments that rank, code and make ‘symbolic judgments’ 
(ibid) about supervised entities in order to allocate resources and legitimise policy interventions 
where supervised entities fall short of expected outcomes. These standards do not just establish 
the criteria for expected behaviour of actors engaged in development finance – whether the 
public financier engaged in blended finance or private sector loans or the private actor in receipt 
of loans or state beneficiaries of the resources – but also set the parameters for reporting and 
evaluating the outcomes of private development finance. For example, the OPIM encompasses 
 
6 Despite efforts to harmonise and coordinate the mobilisation and disbursement of development finance over the 
years,  and lobby for formal, external accountability mechanisms, much of the policymaking, regulation and 
supervision of development finance, including relating to the SDG financing agenda, remains largely conducted 
through non-binding, delegated platforms (see Dann, 2013: 217). 
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‘an end-to-end process’ (IFC, 2019: 2), placing responsibility on the manager of a private 
operation (funded wholly or in part by a public entity or wholly by  a commercial financier) to 
demonstrate intent to achieve a social, environmental or sustainability goal (Principle 1), establish 
a credible narrative on its contribution to achieving these goals (Principle 3), and have systems in 
place to measure the expected positive impact of each investment (Principle 4) while also 
providing a systemic process to assess, address, manage and mitigate negative impacts, described 
as ‘environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks’ (Principle 5) (IFC, 2019: 3 – 4). 
 
However, there remains a disjuncture between broad-brush political and institutional 
commitments to transparency and accountability of blended and private financing for 
development and operational impact, including the alignment with principles of aid effectiveness 
(see OECD, 2005) and implementation of social and environmental safeguards that have 
traditionally been a key feature of development projects and programmes. As documented 
elsewhere, the new mechanisms for channelling blended and private development finance are 
being created outside traditional platforms developed by official financiers to map, track and 
account for official development flows and to mitigate and redress environmental and social 
harms of development projects (Tan, 2019: 311 – 328). While imperfect, established institutional 
frameworks, including safeguards regimes such as the World Bank’s Environment and Social 
Framework (ESF), provide some coherent mechanism for due diligence, accountability and 
redress for harms caused to third parties and public finance channelled through official sector 
financiers and through public mechanisms in recipient states remain governed by more 
transparent and accountable public administrative and procurement laws.  
 
The enmeshment of public and private resources under the SDG financing agenda means that 
much of the supervision, monitoring and redress frameworks will be outsourced to more 
dispersed private ordering regimes, including corporate accountability schemes that have been 
described as ‘norm-rich’ but compliance poor compared to state-sponsored or public regulatory 
systems (Bridgeman and Hunter, 2008: 187 – 190). OPIM, for example, refers to alignment with 
‘industry standards’ and good international industry practice’ when seeking signatory 
commitments to conduct due diligence and mitigate and manage ESG risks (Principles 4 & 5, 
IFC, 2019: 3 – 4). While these industry codes include both public sector codes – such as the 
Harmonised Indicators for Private Sector Operations (HIPSO)7 and IFC Environmental and 
Social Performance Standards8 - and private sector codes – such as the ICMA guidelines, the 
Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS)9, Global Impact Investing Rating System 
(GIIRS) and indicators from the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)10 –  the 
enforcement of these standards would normally be governed by private audit regimes. For 
example, where MDBs lend to financial intermediaries to ‘on-lend’ to private sector entities for a 
development project or where funds are raised in the international capital markets by MDBs and 
DFIs to support private sector operations, the onus will rest on the private entity to undertake 
ESG due diligence and redress mechanisms (Park, 2019; Tan, 2019).  
 
This use of ‘soft’ private regulatory standards mirrors the diffused forms of corporate 
accountability and privatised regulation that has traditionally characterised regulatory form in this 
arena of public and private international law, especially in the fields of international financial 
 
7 The HIPSO are a set of benchmark indicators governing IFI engagement with private entities agreed to by 25 IFIs: 
https://indicators.ifipartnership.org/about/  
8 The IFC’s Performance Standards establish the responsibilities for IFC clients in the management of ESG 
concerns: 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/Sustainability-At-
IFC/Policies-Standards/Performance-Standards   
9 See https://iris.thegiin.org/document/iris-and-giirs/  
10 See https://www.sasb.org/  
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regulation and transnational corporate governance (see Ho, 2019; Picciotto, 2011: 20 – 21). The 
design of many private sector operational grievance mechanisms fall considerably short of 
substantive or procedural standards established by their public sector counterparts, including 
limited operational independence from the project sponsor and the lack of third party review and 
verification (Ong, 2016: 201 & 224). Meanwhile, studies of audit regimes within global supply 
chains have shown that the audit regime is rife with commercial interference that is ultimately 
less about regulating the corporations at the helm of supply chains than about managing the 
reputational fallouts and potential business and legal risks arising from the social and 
environmental impacts of their operations (LeBaron et al, 2017; Lin, 2009). This is consistent 
with general practice observed in relation to compliance with regulatory standards where private 
ordering regimes for industry codes and standards tend to be more effective if implemented in 
the ‘shadow of the law’ or, in other words, sustained by ‘a credible threat of state-supported 
enforcement’, such as contractual claims where these codes are incorporated into legal 
agreements between the parties (Vebruggen, 2017: 309; 321).  
 
4. Technocratic Governance as Discipline 
 
The significance of the ‘private turn’ in development finance go beyond their immediate effects 
on the availability and efficacy of resources to support SDG investments and finance other 
global public goods. It can and will impact on the constitution of global economic governance 
and international economic law more generally. Specifically, the new assemblages of international 
development finance create new forms of discipline on developing countries by 1) enacting new 
forms of transnational regulation that will distribute and allocate capital in way that enforces 
greater economic and geo-political discipline on third world states, and, in doing so, 2) displace 
more endogenous, accessible and accountable systems of policymaking and regulatory oversight 
and abstract the financing agenda from broader questions of global economic inequality and 
redistribution. 
 
(a) Steering Capital 
 
The expansion  of benchmarking indicators for resource allocation and supervision can lead to 
transnational regulation through the back door and entrench opaque private authority in global 
economic governance and lawmaking. First, as discussed previously, indicators can become 
powerful modalities of regulatory control through their power to define the terms under which 
development finance transactions take place. Indicators produce as well as organise knowledge – 
such as on what policy intervention constitute eligible social or environmental investments for 
financing and how to quantify and measure them – and therefore play a crucial role in 
constituting markets and shaping investment decisions of public and private actors (Dadush, 
2012; Petry et al, 2019). These indicators both define and commodify social and environmental 
impact, attaching financial value and risk to prospective and current SDG-related investments, so 
that they can form quantifiable tools for allocating and trading capital (Dadush, 2012; Watts and 
Scales, 2020).   
 
With blended and private capital becoming much more prominent as modes of financing 
development and other global public goods, the use of these indices and matrices can lead to 
what Soederberg terms the ‘new conditionality’ (Soederberg, 2007). As indicators exert greater 
authority over financing decisions, widespread use of these mechanisms can form new 
disciplinary frameworks that can constrain the economic and social policymaking space of 
developing countries in a similar fashion to the ‘old’ forms of aid conditionality (such as under 
structural adjustment or policy-based lending). Instead of being governed directly by traditional 
IFIs and bilateral and multilateral donors, the SDG financing agenda inserts countries into global 
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financial markets (including bond and equity markets and public and private markets) to be 
govern by financial indices, credit ratings and other market rankings, that are central to how 
finance is allocated to sovereign and non-sovereign entities.   
 
In her assessment of the socially responsible investing agenda, Soederberg outlines how non-
financial benchmarking by institutional investors, such as the pension funds that official 
development financiers are now clamouring to engage as development partners, can exert 
significant discipline over developing countries and impose policy and regulatory reform through 
the backdoor (ibid). Soederberg argues that ESG indicators, such as the Permissible Country 
Index used by the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), can ‘reproduce 
neoliberal forms of discipline and exploitation’ through measurements of countries’ social and 
political systems via the imposition of benchmarks of country behaviour based on compliance 
with ‘market-friendly’ strategies (ibid). Coercive measures include divestment from emerging 
markets due to non-compliance with ESG indicators and the creation of a normative 
expectations of behaviour to expand capital market expansion in these countries (ibid).  
 
This normative role of capital market indicators, including ESG benchmarks, often intersect with 
broader market regulatory requirements that influence the content and relative ranking of 
countries and companies within them. For example, in their study of financial indices, such as SP 
500, FTSE 100 or MSCI World, Petry et al reveal how index providers ‘exercise private authority 
in capital markets as they steer investments through indices they create and maintain’, defining 
‘the criteria according to which companies or countries are included into an index’ (2020: 19). 
This, in turn, influences not only the investment decisions of the investors but, crucially, the 
corporate governance policies of companies and regulatory strategies of states dependent on 
such markets for financing. As indices make selective judgements about the policy and 
institutional quality of destination countries’ investment environment, including adherence to 
ESG criteria, there is a corresponding movement to encourage countries to adopt policy and 
regulatory reforms to accommodate and maintain favourable rankings to encourage foreign 
capital. Policy support and technical assistance schemes from IFIs, such as the World Bank, are 
seen as key to enabling domestic reforms that remove operational or regulatory ‘bottlenecks’ to 
the scaling up and entry of foreign private capital for SDG-related investments in developing 
countries (Rowden, 2019: 17 – 18). 
 
A second concern with the increasing influence of private regulatory authority is the composition 
of the regulators and the transnational epistemic community that underpin these regulatory 
networks. This form of technocratic regulation raises fundamental questions over legitimacy of 
those charged with the design of rules governing important aspects of resource allocation and 
transnational regulation. The growth of ‘expert knowledge’ that accompanies the rise of these 
calculative disciplinary practices of benchmarking and audit cannot be separated from those who 
profess expertise in this area. Numerous studies have highlighted the influential role of 
transnational policy networks in the development of technical governance norms and processes 
and the problematic homogeneity of expertise that populate these networks (see for example, 
Broome and Seabrooke, 2015; Picciotto, 2017; Tsingou, 2015).  
 
Tsingou’s landmark paper on expertise and the ideational infrastructure of global financial 
regulation traces the way in which shared understandings among policymakers can drive 
policymaking and regulatory standard-setting in tightly-controlled transnational norm-brokerage 
spaces (Tsingou, 2015). This form of ‘club governance’ (ibid) certainly resonates with the way in 
which the regulatory space for the SDG financing agenda has been constructed. While the 
broader political objectives, such as the SDGs, were negotiated and continue to be monitored 
through the more open, democratic fora of the UN, policymaking for the SDG financing agenda 
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has taken place within more tightly controlled, donor-dominated arenas, such as at the OECD’s 
DAC, and the club-like framework of the EDFI and newly established DFI Alliance (EDFI, 
2019b). 
 
These arenas for policymaking are increasingly dominated not only by public technocrats but 
also private sector entities and a rapidly growing cadre of ‘impact investment’ experts that are 
playing an increasing role in framing the policy agendas of development finance, including the 
setting of funding priorities, programme focus and substantive decisions on the allocation of 
financial resources. For example, the OCED has recently convened a DAC Community of 
Practice on Private Finance for Sustainable Development for dialogue, discussion and 
information sharing among DAC members, the private sector and ‘key stakeholders’ on blended 
finance with an eye towards the development of its Blended Finance Principles (OECD, 2020c). 
Meanwhile, there has been a proliferation of private expertise on impact measurement with the 
growth of the SII market, including through existing mechanisms such as the GIIRs and Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) but also relatively new players such as the Impact Management 
Project (IMP)11 seeking to develop processes and frameworks for defining, measuring and 
reporting on social and environmental impact of investments. 
 
The danger of homogeneity of thought and the danger of ‘cognitive capture’ by dominant 
interests in these regulatory fields is very real (see Picciotto, 2017: 689), especially where 
composition of these networks are not balanced between different stakeholders There has been 
and remains very little input from developing countries or beneficiary communities either into 
the shift towards blended or private financing or into the accompanying process of standard-
setting despite their significant normative impact (UNCTAD, 2019: 77). The power of the 
technocratic norm-makers is bolstered by ‘their claim to scientific authority’ (Fukuda-Oarr and 
McNeil, 2019: 7), with their policy agendas framed as authoritative and operationally legitimate 
because of their abstraction from the messy political contests of conventional regulatory design 
and lawmaking. 
 
It is a form of governance that Dadush describes as characterised ‘by a fundamental experiential 
mismatch’ or ‘simply, the people affected by the issue are distinct from those who formulate the 
issue’ (Dadush, 2012: 430). According to Dadush, the governance structure of platforms such as 
IRIS and GIIRS demonstrate the steering role is undertaken by predominantly US and north-
European-based private entities, and that intended beneficiaries or clients of SII-funded projects 
are not involved nor invited to feed into the substance of the matrices developed to map, track 
and report on impact investments (ibid: 421). In other words, ‘the market for impact is being 
developed largely without substantive input from the ‘impact’ed’ (ibid: 421). 
 
(b) Displacement of Public Oversight 
 
Accompanying the reconfiguration of economic and political authority under the new 
development finance landscape is a reconfiguration of the arenas in which international 
development cooperation is negotiated, implemented and regulated. The pluralisation of 
development actors is creating a ‘hybrid transnationalism’ in international development 
cooperation whereby new actors and alliances are constituted less by geographical or geopolitical 
location – for example, OECD countries, bilaterals or multilaterals, states or non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) – but by networks of causes, such as infrastructure development, 
microfinance, gender equality, carbon market transactions, etc (see Richley and Ponte, 2014: 13 – 
14) that are bound together through webs of private agreements and compacts to deliver 
development finance and meet global public policy challenges. These forms of ‘contractual 
 
11 See https://impactmanagementproject.com/  
14 
 
governance’ (Cutler and Dietz, 2017) are increasingly displacing more formal arenas of law and 
policymaking on international development finance, including oversight over development 
outcomes and social and environmental externalities of development projects and programmes.  
 
These reconfigurations are not only restructuring the relationship between donors, recipients and 
associated stakeholders, they are also reconfiguring developing countries’ engagement with the 
broader global economy and the international legal frameworks that govern it. At one level, the 
abstraction of the technical and operational aspects of financing for development from the 
political contestations over the distribution of global economic resources masks more contingent 
questions over the causes of global impoverishment and inequality that are predicated on 
structural asymmetries in the global economy and the way in which law and regulatory regimes 
act as transmission nodes for global poverty and inequality. As Rosenman argues, the 
deployment of ‘private investment, rather than public redistribution, as the means for enacting 
social change gives investors new power over the future of anti-poverty policy’ and expands 
‘private influence over public policy priorities while decreasing the state’s responsibility for direct 
service provision’ (Rosenman, 2017: 10). 
 
The shift from official lending to sovereign states towards blended and private financing will 
further erode the policy space of countries, tying countries to terms and conditions established 
by official financiers and private financial actors. There are already concerns that the types of 
policy reforms required to encourage private investment and commercial finance – such as the 
deregulation and liberalisation of domestic financial markets and investment regimes – into 
developing countries will reduce the capacity to countries to deploy capital towards social and 
economic sectors that meet domestic productive and reproductive needs and remove the policy 
and regulatory tools for countries to deal with potential financial or debt crises that can occur 
with greater integration in to the global financial system (Rowden, 2019: 10 – 19; UNCTAD, 
2019: 73 – 101).  
 
This continuing depoliticisation of the development sphere in which decisions related to the 
financing or policymaking on international development and GPGs are ‘rendered technical’ so 
that the focus of interventions is less about addressing the broader systemic causes of global 
development challenges – including inequalities in economic opportunities and health and 
educational outcomes due to asymmetries and regulatory gaps in the international economic legal 
order or ecological crises from patterns of neoliberal production and consumption – but seeking 
operationally bounded solutions to a technically defined diagnoses of a development ‘problem’ 
(see Li, 2007: 6 – 8; McCoy and Singh, 2014: 151 – 152). The deployment of ‘innovative financial 
instruments’ to respond to a problem of unequal allocation of global resources often result in 
these platforms being ‘regulated according to a logic of opportunity rather than a politics of 
redistribution’ where structural causes of poverty, inequality and exclusion are ignored in favour 
of less transformative measures to tackle the symptoms of such dislocations (Natile, 2020). 
 
The depoliticisation of development at the global level translates into depoliticitisation of public 
policy at national level. When governments sought to procure financing for public capital 
investments and essential services through official loans and grants from external financiers, 
these forms of financing remain mediated through the state and national budgetary and public 
policy priorities. The privatised financing agenda means such decisions are now made by external 
actors or between external actors and the executive arm of government, For example, terms of 
financing, such as under project and meso-level PPPs funded through DFIs, are often negotiated 
and agreed upon outside the purview of national legislatures or other spaces for political and 
judicial oversight of executive power (see for example, Tan and Cotula, 2018) while tapping into 
international impact investing  markets means that financing is contingent on the interests and 
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terms set by international investors and industry codes established externally. This can 
significantly reduce the space for political mobilisation and civic society representation on 
fundamental issues of allocation and distribution of economic and other resources. 
 
Another consequence of the move away from official sector to blended and private finance is the 
potential weakening of the compact between the state and communities as the state transitions 
away from a funder of public services to a broker of public service investments delivered by 
private actors and/or a mediator of communities’ access to public goods and services. As Moore 
demonstrates in relation to the donor branding of humanitarian aid to post-conflict states, the 
performativity of the state’s role in providing essential goods and services to its populace is as 
important as its perceived efficacy in doing so by its citizens and residents (Moore, 2018). For 
the vast majority of people, and more acutely in developing countries, access to public goods and 
services, such as healthcare, education, water and sanitation, energy supply and transportation, 
are pivotal mechanisms through which they encounter the state. Thus, the ‘ability of the state to 
provide public goods to its people and to receive credit for providing them plays an essential role 
in [establishing its] legitimacy’ and sustaining its authority, particularly within fractured and 
recuperating democratic spaces, notably those transiting from conflict or disaster situations 
(ibid). 
 
The accountability gaps at the international level also transfers responsibility for financial 
oversight to national levels, necessitating changes in the regulatory and administrative structures 
of resource and capacity-strapped developing countries to accommodate new exercises of public 
authority by private entities or reformulating public law and administrative governance regimes 
to manage the shifting relationship between the state and private sector providers of public 
goods and services. As Feigenbaum and Henig have argued, ‘[i]n shifting responsibilities from 
government to market, privatization potentially alters the institutional framework through which 
citizens normally articulate, mediate, and promote their individual and shared interests’ with the 
impact of this ‘institutional restructuring’ falling differentially across different constituencies 
(Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994: 186).  
 
At the same time, the construction of social and environmental accountability through private 
ordering regimes that underpin the SDG financing agenda has also enabled a discursive and 
operational shift from accountability frameworks that address harms caused by corporate and 
commercial actors to local communities to managing and mitigating these harms as corporate 
ESG risks to the private entity. The disciplinary force of this shift means that law and regulatory 
orderings under this new architecture addresses less the ‘risk-to-people’ than it does the ‘risk-to-
corporation’ (Shamir and Weiss, 2012: 129). This process decentres communities from the 
processes of social investment and economic transformations that are purportedly aimed at 
improve their lives. Again, experience with audit regimes for global supply chains have shown 
that governance regimes designed primarily by private actors – corporate and non-profit actors, 
such as NGOs – rarely generate lasting or substantive material outcomes for communities but 
can instead create ‘an illusion of governance effectiveness’ that stabilise rather than resolve the 
problems created by corporate globalization (LeBaron et al, 2017: 961).  
 
Countries and communities have little or no say in how finance is channelled to them or under 
what terms and where such finance will be deployed. As Cutler argues, this shifts regulatory 
control ‘from what was traditionally state-based, constitutionally backed, and socially embedded 
production to private hands’ (Cutler, 2017: 89). This can lead to legal transplantation and 
policymaking through the backdoor where corporate actors have greater influence over the 
design and implementation of regulation than domestic policymakers and local communities 






The governance changes that accompany the ‘private turn’ in development finance has broader 
implications for developing countries engagement with the global economy and the international 
and transnational law which sustains it. This operational shift towards the engagement of private 
non-profit and for-profit actors in international public financing has been accompanied by a 
redefinition of the purposes for multilateral and bilateral finance, particularly development 
finance. Audit culture as a fundamental component of the new assemblage of international 
development, creates new forms of the governance that complicates relationships between states, 
and between states and communities. The turn to standards and codes and indicators as the 
governing regime for private development finance is as much performative as well as regulatory. 
They signal to certain audiences a narrative and legitimises the broader shift towards privatised 
financial regimes and fragmented governance. As Power argues, ‘[a]udit is not simply a solution 
to a technical problem; it also makes possible ways of redesigning the practice of government’ 
(Power, 1997: 11).  
 
The use of the aforementioned calculative practices in the governance of development finance is 
highly problematic and can undermine the objectives of the SDGs they purport to finance. 
Although these measures are in their infancy, the emergence of the web of regulatory indicators 
and audit regimes that are developing to monitor and assess countries’ engagement with the 
SDGs, are beginning to constitute a complex framework of organising and managing countries’ 
access to external finance. At the same time, the decentering of voices and interests of the 
population to whom SDG-finance is targeting is an outcome of the process of depoliticisation 
and technisation that has characterised its development and implementation and is leading to 
broader governance and substantive social and economic concerns. This has significant 
implications in a COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 global environment where developing 
countries are much more exposed and reliant than ever to the external financial exigencies. The 
framing of global development challenges as a technical problem requiring technical solutions 
abstracts these issues from political contestations over equitable distribution of global economic 
resources and limits the potential for radically reconstituting the international economic order to 
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